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1 INTRODUCTION 
Auto parts industry used to be somewhat neglected by analysts and policy-makers. In the 
1980s, however, automotive component sector has emerged as an important industry in its 
own right due to momentous changes in technology, organisation and trade. The role of 
component suppliers has significantly increased not only in production but in design as well; 
their technical and economic performance has become a key factor in the fatal competition 
fought by major car manufacturers. Thus it is crucial to analyse this industry both from 
theoretical and practical, that is, industrial policy, point of view. 
It is particularly so in Hungary for a number of reasons. First, the performance of this 
sector can be regarded as a sort of proxy variable to gauge the success of transition to market 
economy. Hungarian car parts suppliers have lost their former principal market with the 
collapse of CMEA but just then major foreign investors have entered the Hungarian market; 
Suzuki and GM Opel have opened car assembly plants, the latter one an engine assembly 
plant, too; while Ford and Audi have invested in an electrical component factory and an 
engine plant, respectively. Thus the new market opportunities are there for the Hungarian 
companies – in fact no planning office on earth could have ever planned such a timely 
structural change –; it is now their task to seize this chance for re-structuring and survival. 
A second important, and closely related, question is the speed and extent of the diffusion 
of a new production paradigm, namely, lean production, and of new products, processes, 
management and organisational culture and techniques, e.g. just-in-time, total quality control, 
as required by the aforementioned foreign investors and other companies active as buyers. 
Will an archipelago of relatively advanced suppliers emerge, with these new developments 
being locked into an enclave, or can these new products, processes and management 
techniques diffuse in a wider circle through second and third tier suppliers? Can Hungarian 
companies also become competitive in other markets, given that they are able to meet the 
exacting demand of Audi, Ford, Opel Hungary and Magyar Suzuki? 
Third, more generally, can this ‘on-the-job training’ accelerate the badly needed market 
re-orientation and transition? What is, and, should be, the role of the Hungarian government 
to facilitate this process? 
This article cannot provide exhaustive, comprehensive and ‘final’ answers to these 
questions for two basic reasons. First, for the plain fact that no statistics are readily available 
as auto parts sector is not treated as an independent industry by the Central Statistical Office.1 
Moreover, some large companies involved in auto parts production are diversified ones with 
a really wide range of rather different products, and hence individual data collection would 
be required to compile reliable statistics. Therefore the performance of the sector as whole – 
in terms of shifts in the structure of foreign trade, profitability, productivity, etc. – cannot be 
analysed in a methodologically satisfactory manner. 
Second, the above questions would also require a vast number of interviews. It is needless 
to stress that the interview method is a rather costly one, and thus resources allocated for this 
research have not allowed to provide complete, detailed answers for all the above questions. 
                                                
1 One should not be surprised, indeed. Until fairly recently, this sector has been ‘a dark continent’ even in the 
UK, although the British automotive industry has been much more significant than the Hungarian one: 
“In the mid 1980s, the automotive components industry was a dark continent: very little was really known 
about the number of suppliers, the size of the sector in turnover or employment, etc. This situation has since 
been improved by the publication of several research projects, consultants’ reports and DTI initiatives. 
There is now a recognition of the importance of taking a broad view - including component suppliers in the 
industry context - but there is still a need for better information and intelligence." (DTI and SMMT [1994], 
p. 6) 
2 
Still, I strongly believe that it has been worthwhile raising these questions, partly because 
they put this article into a broader context, and partly because they provide some guidance 
for further research. 
Given these constraints, the modest aim of this article, based on an extensive literature 
survey and interviews with managers, is not more than to shed some light on the on-going re-
structuring process in the Hungarian car parts industry. To circumvent the aforementioned 
constraints, a carefully selected series of interviews has been designed with ‘qualitatively’ 
representative firms, in an attempt to capture differences in ownership, size, portfolio of 
activities (i.e. specialised in automotive parts vs. diversified), markets and technologies. No 
doubt, this method does not meet the rigorous standards of statistical representation. Yet, it is 
hoped that the most significant issues can be addressed in this way, and hence informed 
guesses can also be formed about the most likely developments in the near future. 
2 EVOLUTION OF CAR AND CAR PARTS INDUSTRIES 
Car manufacturing is often regarded as the ‘industry of industries’. It does not seem to be an 
overstatement if one considers its implications for other industries (substantial demand for 
other industries, such as metal, glass, rubber, chemical, petro-chemical, electric, electronics, 
textile and leather industries, as well as road construction with all the additional 
infrastructure requirements; and radically new opportunities in transportation), impacts on 
work organisation (mass production has diffused in other industries as well since it has been 
developed by Ford in the 1920s and nowadays lean production is also gaining importance in 
other sectors), on employment, vocational training, consumption and life style. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that this industry has bearings on international politics, too (see, e.g. the 
on-going trade battle among Japan, the US and the EU). Moreover, given the ever-increasing 
pollution, it also becomes an issue in domestic politics. 
2.1 Technological changes and production paradigms 
No technological breakthrough has occurred in automotive industry since the development of 
the internal combustion engine. Thousands of incremental technological innovations, 
however, have substantially improved basically all features of cars (speed, fuel consumption, 
comfort, safety, appearance, etc.), while significant organisational innovations have 
completely reshaped the industry itself. Three major production systems, namely craft, 
Fordist mass and lean production paradigms, can be identified, each of them with rather 
distinct characteristics as far as the role of component suppliers is concerned. 
These different production paradigms had significant impacts on design of cars, 
organisation of production and marketing, and hence the performance of the industry. In 
other words, any shift from one production system to another one has meant significant 
changes in the division of labour as well as in the distribution of profits between parts 
suppliers and car assemblers.2 
2.2 The technical and economic importance of auto parts industry 
While information on automotive component sector used to be subsumed under the motor 
vehicle industry, it became a new ‘entry’ in international statistics in the 1980s due to its 
economic significance. A simple reason is that on average 10000–12000 parts are built into a 
                                                
2 For more detailed analyses see Bongardt [1992], Clark et al. [1987], Helper [1991], Helper and Sako [1995], 
Lamming [1993] and Womack et al. [1991]. 
3 
car accounting for some 50–70% of the manufacturing cost of an automobile. Other factors, 
however, seem to be even more important in explaining the economic significance of auto 
parts sector. One is the increasing trend in the trade of parts and components for several 
reasons, the other one is the importance of technological improvement, due to the extremely 
fierce competition, and the new role of suppliers in it. (OECD [1992]) 
 
A) Increasing trade in parts and components, since 
· there is hardly any vertical integration in lean firms, and the growing pressure from lean 
competitors has lead to a decreasing vertical integration in ‘Fordist’ firms (increasing out-
sourcing); 
· competition and changing demand patterns require to locate production close to actual 
markets, and hence parts, subassemblies and kits have emerged as substitutes for fully 
assembled vehicles; 
· technological changes, in particular the increasing use of ‘platforms’, have reduced the 
minimum efficient scale of assembly plants (i.e. decisive factors of scale economies have 
changed), and smaller assembly plants can be supplied with parts from outside sources. 
 
B) Importance of technological improvement of suppliers 
• lean production requires from suppliers the introduction of just-in-time delivery, total 
quality control, low-cost production, and, in most cases, increased responsibility for 
product development, i.e. substantially improved and different technological capabilities 
compared to the requirements of the Fordist mass production; 
• product technology is deemed to be the future competitive ‘battlefield’ by industry 
analysts, and suppliers are supposed to play a significant role in this battle. Car 
manufacturing is one of the most competitive industry nowadays basically for two 
reasons. Lean producers apply a tremendous pressure on established mass producers 
offering cheaper cars of better quality, wider choice of model variations, more frequent 
model changes, faster delivery, etc. This development coupled with slow (or hardly any) 
growth in demand has resulted in a really severe competition. As no further possibilities 
for organisational breakthrough to reduce costs and/or increase efficiency can be 
envisaged since lean production is already introduced, product development is of vital 
importance to improve safety, fuel economy and comfort, and to develop ‘intelligent 
cars’, etc. Due to again the introduction of lean production, component suppliers have an 
increasing responsibility in product development. 
The following sections address the question how Hungarian car parts suppliers can adjust 
to these shifts in production systems and international settings. First their history is 
summarised briefly since inherited norms, attitudes as well as accumulated knowledge and 
skills are certainly influencing this adjustment process. 
3 TRADITIONS OF THE HUNGARIAN CAR AND CAR PARTS INDUSTRIES3 
3.1 Craft production before 1945 
Cars, first assembled from imported parts, had been produced in Hungary since 1903. 1905 
saw the first car designed and built by a Hungarian engineer, János Csonka. All the major car 
parts, such as engines, gears, chassis, had also been produced in Hungary until the mid-
                                                
3 For a more detailed analysis see Havas [1995b]. 
4 
1940s, i.e. firms engaged in car manufacturing had not been mere ‘semi-knocked down’ 
plants of major foreign companies. 
However, as only a few dozens of cars were turned out a year by two–three companies, 
most cars sold in Hungary were imported from Germany, Italy, the US and France (in 
descending order). 
3.2 Heritage of the CMEA 
Automotive production facilities were ruined during the war. Once they were restored, 
manufacturing of motorcycles, buses, lorries and other commercial vehicles started again. 
Car production, however, was abandoned given the new industrial policy. This policy first 
was influenced somewhat informally by Soviet advisors working in Hungary and then by a 
formal Soviet-Hungarian specialisation agreement signed in 1964. The overall goal of this 
accord was to co-ordinate the two countries’ industrial development projects – in the wider 
context of CMEA – in a number of industries, including automotive manufacturing. As in the 
case of all preferred sectors, a specific government programme was elaborated to promote 
vehicle production, too. Among other targets it stipulated to increase significantly the bus 
production capacity in Hungary to serve the whole CMEA area. As a result of this huge 
investment project, one the largest European bus manufacturing firm was established in the 
1960s, turning out some 14,000 units a year in the 1980s.4 
Hence lack of car manufacturing since the late 1940s did not meant the waste of 
considerable assets and skills accumulated in auto parts sector. Another opportunity for, or to 
be more accurate, another mandatory duty of, Hungarian suppliers was to ship car parts to 
other CMEA countries since the 1960s.5 In most cases it was an advantageous business for 
them given the large production runs and relatively low-level technical and quality 
requirements. Moreover, they also enjoyed a favourable bargaining position vis-à-vis the 
Hungarian authorities responsible for resource allocation given particular political and 
economic factors. First, cars used to be regarded as important goods to make people satisfied 
in Hungary, where ‘socialism’ became much more ‘relaxed’ or ‘liberal’ than in other CMEA 
countries. Second, a severe shortage of cars prevailed: buyers had to wait for 3–5 years, or 
even longer for the most popular models, since almost all cars sold in Hungary were 
imported from the CMEA countries in this period. As these ‘politically precious’ goods were 
exchanged for auto parts, these companies benefited from this peculiar situation, indeed: it 
was relatively easy for them to acquire otherwise scarce resources, such as investment and 
wage funds. 
Certain car parts, e.g. bulbs, batteries and dash boards, were also exported for hard 
currencies (to Western Europe, the US and India).6 This reinforced the favourable bargaining 
position of these companies since another priority of the government’s economic policy was 
to increase hard currency exports revenues because of the mounting foreign debt. Other 
                                                
4 Production was still 12,350 and 11,980 units in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The collapse of CMEA caused a 
dramatic drop in the last five years: output fell to 7,994 buses in 1990, and then every year saw a further 
decline. Thus output was a mere 1,576 units in 1994. (National Bank of Hungary, Monthly Report, 3/1995) 
5 The single most important buyer was the (former) Soviet VAZ (Lada) factory. Other significant customers 
included the Polish FSO and FSM (Polski Fiat) companies as well as Dacia in Romania. Although (the former) 
Yugoslavia has never joined the CMEA, Hungarian parts were also shipped to her car producer, Zastava (now 
in Serbia) until the recent UN embargo. Primarily ignition timers and switches, windscreen-wiper sets, horns, 
dash boards, door locks, car keys, boot-lock cylinders and batteries have been exported. Given the lack of 
sectoral statistics, aggregate CMEA-sales data are not available. 
6 Once again, the lack of sectoral statistics prevents one from presenting data on these export activities. 
5 
companies, producing and exporting parts only for commercial vehicles, e.g. engines, axles, 
undercarriages and tyres, also rode on these policy measures aimed at promoting exports 
accounted in hard currencies. 
Given the characteristics of CMEA, again, severe shortage occurred in the aftermarket of 
car parts as well. Thus some firms, in particular small and medium-sized private or semi-
private ones, started to produce lacking, but from a manufacturing point of view relatively 
simple, spare parts for Soviet, Polish and Romanian made cars running in Hungary. 
4 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD 
Quite dramatic changes have occurred in the transition period, influencing rather forcefully 
all elements of the wider techno-economic environment of car parts manufacturing. Some of 
these moves have directly been caused by the transition process itself, some others have been 
decided earlier. In the following subsections these shifts are discussed briefly. 
4.1 Liberalised imports 
To begin with the most general development, roughly 90% of total imports has been 
liberalised since 1989, i.e. before the 1990 general elections which marked the political 
changes. The overall aim of this measure, taken by the last ‘socialist’ government, was to 
introduce import competition as an important step towards market economy, and provide 
easier access to raw materials and components to improve the international competitiveness 
of Hungarian companies. As for cars, unlike in other markets, the major concern was to 
eliminate the severe shortage prevailing for decades. Thus obstacles to private imports of cars 
were removed in September 1989, including the liberalisation of private foreign-currency 
bank accounts.7 The former monopoly of a state-owned foreign trade company importing 
cars and that of the only distributor of cars was broken 1990 as dozens of private companies 
started to sell both new and second-hand cars. There are no queues at all, on the contrary, 
now the dealers are the ones who are waiting for buyers. As they are competing for clients, a 
number of favourable loan and leasing schemes are also offered. 
As for car parts manufacturing, thanks to liberalised imports these companies are not at 
the mercy of their domestic suppliers any more. Now they can easily turn to foreign 
competitors for cheaper and/or better raw materials or intermediary products or timely, more 
reliable shipment.8 
Import liberalisation has another direct impact on Hungarian car parts manufacturing. 
Soviet cars (Ladas) have always been imported in exchange for Hungarian car parts. Until 
the late 1980s buyers were waiting for these cars for years, and thus Hungarian politicians 
were begging for them when negotiating annual plans with their Soviet counterparts. The 
effective constraints in that period were the capacity of the Lada factory and the Hungarian 
capability to supply parts. The situation has completely changed since then: now the 
Hungarian capability to sell these parts is constrained by Lada sales in Hungary as demand 
                                                
7 Later on various restrictive measures, such as 25% VAT, increased import tariffs, import quota, technical and 
environmental test for cars over 6 years, etc., have been introduced again in several steps so as to curb the 
outflow of foreign exchange and the influx of ‘moving wrecks’. A detailed account of these measures and 
comments are provided in Somai [1993]. pp. 4-7. 
8 Quite often they find better services abroad, e.g. a company producing spark plugs does import metal parts 
from Italy because its cheaper than to buy those parts in Hungary. 
6 
has dropped significantly – by around two thirds – for two reasons.9 First, previously cheap 
CMEA cars became rather expensive in 1990–91 because of higher taxes and the 
introduction of dollar accounting in CMEA trade.10 Second, with liberalised imports, quite a 
few buyers have opted for second-hand, but more up-to-date, Western or Japanese makes 
instead of ‘the good old’ Lada.11 Hence Hungarian companies supplying Lada parts have lost 
a significant chunk of their former sales.12 Not surprisingly it has caused severe financial 
difficulties, even near-bankruptcy situations in quite a few cases.13 
4.2 Re-structuring in other CMEA countries 
4.2.1 Intense competition 
Generally speaking, competition has become genuine in the former CMEA countries, too, as 
the once intra-CMEA trade has been conducted in hard currencies since 1990, and imports 
have also been liberalised. Insolvency of CIS countries poses another major hurdle to 
Hungarian exports to these, once the single most important, markets. 
Hungarian automotive parts manufacturers, too, previously enjoying monopoly, or quasi-
monopoly in these markets, now have to face competitors both from advanced and newly 
industrialising countries as well as the financial difficulties of their former buyers. It clearly 
hinders the export of automotive parts, such as tyres, bulbs as well as the export of capital 
goods used in the CIS automobile industry, e.g. painting robots. Indirect exports have also 
been effected by these factors. The most obvious example is the case of bus manufacturing. 
As already mentioned Hungarian bus production has dropped by almost 87% because of the 
shrinking exports to the CIS countries. Thus bus parts suppliers’ sales have also diminished. 
4.2.2 Privatisation of the Central and Eastern European automotive industry 
Clearly, strategic moves of major Western car and car parts producers in Central and Eastern 
European countries also have crucial bearings on Hungarian suppliers’ business 
opportunities. Thus it is worth mentioning some recent developments.14 
The major Czech and Polish car factories have already been privatised: Skoda by 
Volkswagen, Fabryka Samochodow Malolitrazowych (FSM) by Fiat, while General Motors 
formed a joint venture, GM Poland, with Fabryka Samochodow Osobowych (FSO), basically 
                                                
9 New car sales have fell to a similar extent in 1991-92, and thus Lada was still the leading make in new car 
sales with its 23% market share in 1992. However, as sales recovered in 1993-94, partly because Opel and 
Suzuki commenced production in Hungary in 1992, these latter makes gained market share at the expense of 
Lada. (for further details see Section 4.3. and Table 7) 
10 There used to be a bizarre exchange rate system in the former CMEA. In the late 1980s, when intra-CMEA 
trade was still conducted in roubles, 1 rouble was equal to some 26-27 forints while 1 US dollar to around 70 
forints. The exchange rate of the rouble, though, was around 0.9 US dollar. Thus prices expressed in forint, 
automatically increased by 2-3 times when the US dollar replaced the rouble. 
11 Private car imports jumped from 5-6 thousand units in 1987-88 to more than 68 thousand units in 1989. 
(Autókatalógus ‘93, cited in Somai [1993]) 
12 Given the lack of sectoral statistics, aggregate data on the decline of the former CMEA-export are not 
available. Companies, on the other hand, are reluctant to disclose such sensitive pieces of information, 
especially in these harsh days of transition. 
13 Polski Fiat and Dacia used to be popular makes, too, accounting for 6.5% and 10.2% of the Hungarian car 
parc in 1990. Their sales, however, collapsed virtually overnight because of significantly higher prices. It did 
not cause crucial impacts on Hungarian car parts suppliers, though, as shipments to these factories had only 
accounted for a small proportion of their output. 
14 For a more detailed account and analysis see Havas [1995b-d]. 
7 
to avoid trade barriers. Ford is also investing in Polish green-field plant to assemble cars and 
transit vans from 1998. VW has privatised a Slovak company, too, while Daewoo and 
Peugeot are planning to build cars in Romania. Renault and Rover are considering to invest 
in Ukraine and Bulgaria, respectively. 
Component manufacturing is also undergoing major changes in the Central European 
countries, partly because of foreign suppliers’ entry, and partly as a consequence of the 
exacting demand of the privatised car assemblers. 
4.2.3 Lessons for Hungarian managers 
Although the actual consequences of the above privatisation projects for the Hungarian parts 
suppliers cannot be reversed, managers can benefit from studying these cases: a thorough 
analysis of motives, current moves, and likely future actions, of foreign investors in the other 
Central European countries might reveal useful conclusions for their own future strategies. 
The new owners of the Czech and Polish car companies have already started to change their 
supply base. It is particularly harmful for the Hungarian automotive firms in the case of 
Poland where they used to have more significant businesses than in the Czech Republic. For 
instance a long established Hungarian supplier for the previous Polski Fiat models lost its 
former Polish business: although it had also developed a new dashboard for the new 
Cinquecento, Fiat chose its own supplier in which it has a majority stake.15 Even if Fiat is 
moving away from its in-house component manufacturers, as certain developments suggest,16 
it is rather unlikely that Hungarian companies can assume the responsibilities of being first-
tier suppliers. It is even less so, as the overall trend is to reduce the number of direct suppliers 
in an attempt to cut costs. 
Daewoo, on the other hand, intends to order certain parts from Hungarian suppliers, i.e. 
privatisation in the neighbouring countries might also provide new market opportunities. 
Although Hungarian companies traditionally had less business with Skoda than with FSM 
and FSO, it might prove profitable to study the VW-Skoda case, too, from the point of view 
suppliers. Given that AUDI, another member of the VW group has recently started building 
engines in Hungary, and most parts are purchased at a group level rather then by the group 
members themselves, there might some chances to become a supplier of the VW group 
through the Hungarian AUDI plant. Hence it is worth citing some observations and a Czech 
supplier’s view from a recent article: 
“Helped by its semi-monopoly position, VW has taken a get-tough attitude towards 
Skoda’s parts suppliers (...) Some complain that Skoda wants prices below cost, abusing 
its monopolistic position on the Czech market to get its way. ‘Skoda wants to take things 
as cheaply as possible, which I understand,’ says Zdenek Brenner, economic director of 
Pal (...) ‘But it doesn’t want us to project into current prices increases in material costs. If 
the world prices of zinc and copper go up, they don’t want our prices to reflect that. I 
don’t even want to talk about what they said might happen if we don’t keep our prices 
down.’” (Calbreath [1995], p. 9) 
The biggest threat for Hungarian suppliers, however, by far is the planned privatisation of 
VAZ (Lada) by GM for two reasons: (a) this was, and still the largest, market for quite a few 
Hungarian parts suppliers, and (b) GM is highly vertically integrated, i.e. taking over the 
rather huge Russian assembly capacity it might want to switch to its own formidable in-house 
                                                
15 It should be noted that Fiat is the most vertically integrated Western European car manufacturer. 
16 See Europe Automotive Insight, October 1994 and February 1995. 
8 
supplier capacity, in particular as those divisions were suffering from recession in their 
current markets in the last couple of years. 
4.3 Re-emerging car production in Hungary 
4.3.1 A policy dilemma 
Hungarian government officials have long intended to re-establish some sort of car industry 
for two basic reasons. First, to ease the severe shortage in this market since it has been a 
rather annoying situation from a political point of view in the most ‘liberal’, reformed 
planned economy – often referred to as ‘goulash communism’ in Western media. Clearly, 
this severe shortage have resulted in an ageing, obsolete car park: while the average age of 
the Hungarian car stock was 5.3 years in 1970, almost two thirds of it were more than 7 years 
old by 1986. 
 
Table 1: The distribution of the Hungarian car parc by age, 1986 
Age (years) Share (per cent) 
  – 3 19.2 
 4–6 18.4 
 7–9 20.4 
10 – 42.0 
Source: Central Statistical Office 
Second, car industry was also deemed as a means of industrial modernisation with its 
exacting technical and organisational requirements. Quite a few industrialists also backed the 
idea conceiving it either as a major step forward on the road of integration into the world 
economy, i.e. out of the isolation of CMEA, or as another golden opportunity for free-riding, 
that is to obtain immense investment funds yet again. Even two consortia were set up by 
Hungarian companies to promote the re-establishment of car industry. 
One question, however, divided this apparently unified camp of promoters, namely 
whether to opt for large scale manufacturing of car parts with the aim of becoming suppliers 
of major car producers or to assemble cars again, after a rather long interval, lasting for 
almost 50 years.17 As for the second option, it was also an open and much debated question 
whether to do so within the CMEA or in co-operation with advanced countries. Thus a 
number of delegations were received from the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and from the 
US, Germany, Japan and South-Korea, on the other. To cut this long story short, it is safe to 
point out that no decision was taken by the Hungarian government on this controversial 
issue. Rather, it was two foreign car companies, looking for favourable new locations and 
market opportunities, who eventually ‘resurrected’ the Hungarian car manufacturing in the 
early 1990s. 
4.3.2 Magyar Suzuki 
Magyar Suzuki Corporation, a Japanese-Hungarian joint venture to manufacture compact 
cars in Hungary was set up after a fairly lengthy negotiation process by signing the Articles 
of Association on 24 April 1990.18 The founding capital was ¥10bn, equivalent to 5.5 bn 
                                                
17 These confronting opinions are described in more detail, e.g., by Somai [1993] and Varga [1990]. 
18 Talks with Hungarian officials and would be partners started as early as 1985. Further details and analysis of 
the preparation phase are reported in Havas and Inzelt [1993]. 
This section is based on interviews with Magyar Suzuki managers, company documents as well as press reports. 
9 
Hungarian forint (Ft) then. Shareholders included Suzuki Motor Corporation (40%), Itochu 
trading house19 (11%), IFC, International Finance Corporation (9%) and Autókonszern Rt.20 
(40%). 
The $250m investment has been financed by the equity and loans, guaranteed by the 
Hungarian government, provided by the Japanese EXIM Bank and IFC as well as a near 
Ft260m government subsidy. Additional policy measures are also at work to reduce Magyar 
Suzuki’s operating costs: (a) a five-year tax holiday, which can be extended for further 5 
years, (b) a five-year exemption from customs duties on parts to be built into cars produced 
by Magyar Suzuki,21 and (c) grants from the Ministry of International Economic Relations on 
a case-by-case base to cover trade fairs’ costs. 
After thorough training projects, partly conducted in Japan, and a one-week pilot 
production in August 1992, commercial production commenced in October 1992 with one 
shift. The then product range included Suzuki Swift 1.0l and 1.3l 5-door hatchback versions, 
equipped with 3 way catalytic converters. Another model, namely the 4-door Suzuki Swift 
Sedan, was added in May 1993. 
Equity was raised to Ft14bn in two steps in 1993 for two reasons. First, further investment 
was required to start the production of Sedans, around 900 million forint, basically in 
pressing equipment and tools. Second, and more importantly, mounting losses also called for 
a decisive action: as the Japan EXIM Bank has provided its immense loan in yen, the sharply 
rising value of this currency has resulted in a loss of more than 5 billion forints since 
accounting is conducted in Hungarian forint. Thus it has seemed reasonable to raise equity 
and use it to pay back as much loan as possible. 
 
Table 2: Changes in Magyar Suzuki’s ownership structure 
 April 1990 Dec. 1993 
Equity (bn forints) 5.5 14.2 
Share of owners (per cent)   
  Suzuki Motor Corporation 40.0 55.2 
  Itochu trading house  11.0 13.6 
  IFC, International Finance Corporation  9.0 3.5 
  Autókonszern Rt. 40.0 24.9 
  Hungarian Investment and Development Bank Ltd. – 2.8 
Total 100 100 
Source: Magyar Suzuki 
Another major step followed a few months later: the Hungarian managing director became 
deputy managing director, and its former Japanese deputy was appointed as managing 
director in April 1994. Magyar Suzuki, however, remained in the red in 1994, too, as re-
capitalisation and change at the top alone were not sufficient to eliminate losses. Its Japanese 
owners now expect profits by 1996–97.22 
                                                
19 Known as C. Itoh then. 
20 Autókonszern Rt. can be regarded as successor of one of the two consortia, mentioned above, founded to 
promote car manufacturing. 
21 Further parts, i.e. those above a set quota, are subjects to an 8% duty. 
22 Although exact figures on losses are not disclosed by Magyar Suzuki, its chairman has recently admitted that 
losses in 1994 amounted to a few billion forints. (Figyelõ, February 16, 1995) 
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Clearly, one crucial step on the road to become profitable is to increase production and 
sales in order to achieve economies of scale. The nominal capacity of Magyar Suzuki is 
50,000 units a year. Original plans called for working at full capacity in 1995. It was also 
planned to export roughly 50 per cent of the output, partly to the then ‘hungry’ CMEA 
markets, and partly – once ‘the EU content’ achieves 60 per cent – to the EU to avoid high 
tariffs imposed on cars imported from Japan. Production plans, however, had to be revised 
downward basically every year because the declining standard of living and the importation 
of second-hand cars depressed the new car market in Hungary, while exports to the former 
CMEA countries were hindered by the very same factors. Thus some 13,000 units were 
turned out by Magyar Suzuki in 1993, i.e. 5,000 units less than planned originally. Exports 
started in 1994, and hence output reached some 20,000 cars (plans called for 29–30 
thousands), of which some 3,300 units (instead of the projected 10–12 thousand ones) were 
exported primarily to Western Europe (some 70 per cent of the total exports) and China 
(around 25 per cent of exports). 
Magyar Suzuki, facing the lower-than-expected demand, is seeking to fully utilise its 
capacity. To boost local sales it introduced a new model, the 1.6l Sedan in 1994 and also 
offered a number of small series of former models with special colours and extras (e.g. 
automatic gearbox) in an attempt to target particular customer groups. Another new model, 
namely the 3-door hatchback version of Suzuki Swift 1.0l was added in April 1995. 
Further, Suzuki Motor Corp. announced in 1995 that it has stopped exporting cars from 
Japan to Western Europe, and thus its dealers will sell cars assembled in Hungary – as 
planned at the beginning. Thus the most recent production programme indicates that Magyar 
Suzuki doubles its output, i.e. 40,000 cars should roll off the assembly line in 1995, of which 
50 per cent is to be sold in Hungary, and the remaining half to be exported, mainly to the 
EU.23 
Magyar Suzuki is also going to produce four-wheel-drive cars for its Japanese rival, Fuji 
Heavy Industries (FHI), under an original equipment manufacture deal. From mid-1995 up to 
10,000–12,000 units a year will be supplied to FHI, which will sell them in Western Europe 
badged as Subaru Justy. The two companies also agreed in June 1994 to co-operate in 
developing automatic transmissions, and hence this more recent agreement might suggest 
they could move to joint development of cars to cut their R&D costs. 
 
Table 3: Major data of Magyar Suzuki 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 
    plan 
Production 992 13,021 19,412 40,000 
Domestic sales (units) 929 12,659 16,065 20,000 
Exports (units) – – 3,309 20,000 
Sales (Ft bn) 0.6 9.6 15.5 40 
  Domestic sales (Ft bn) 0.6 9.6 13.3 20 
  Exports (Ft bn) – – 2.2 20 
Employment 355 489 857 1,000 
Source: Magyar Suzuki and press reports 
                                                
23 In 1994 some 74,000 Suzuki cars were sold in Western Europe. (Europe Automotive Insight, February 1995) 
Certain models, however, are not assembled in Hungary, e.g. four-wheel-drive sport and utility vehicles. Thus 
sales opportunities for Magyar Suzuki do not equal to 74,000 cars a year in Western Europe. 
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From the point of view of suppliers (and would-be suppliers) there are two critical issues: 
production runs and the technical level of parts demanded by an assembler. The 
aforementioned production data indicate that Magyar Suzuki buys parts in rather low 
volumes, and hence its suppliers badly need other businesses. 
Magyar Suzuki, however, pays special attention to the profitability of its suppliers as it 
follows a single-sourcing strategy. Thus it does not want to rely on suppliers who give 
uneconomical low quotes so as to win orders but then might have to exit because of 
bankruptcy, leaving Magyar Suzuki with no supply. Moreover, it does believe that 
economical manufacturing of the parts requested from Hungarian suppliers is possible in 
spite of the relatively small batches.24 
Thus the first step to establish this close producer-supplier relationship is a thorough 
technological and financial audit, covering literally every single aspect of doing business 
from purchasing inputs through production methods and machinery, to accounting, sales and 
management, broadly defined. It is followed by a meticulous price setting procedure if the 
supplier in question seems to be capable to meet all the requirements. During these 
negotiations, nonetheless, Magyar Suzuki managers have often found that their partners have 
not possessed reliable information on their products’ profitability. In these cases the 
introduction of a more instructive cost accounting system has been a prerequisite. This ‘on-
the-job training’ for the Hungarian managers in question can, and should, indeed, be regarded 
as a significant contribution to the diffusion of up-to-date management techniques required 
by market economy.25 
Local content – including pressing, welding, painting and assembly accounting for around 
20–22% of a Suzuki Swift’s value and carried out by Magyar Suzuki itself – was 29% in 
October 1992, it reached 42% by the end of 1993, and 50% by October 1994. Parts and 
components produced by local suppliers include battery, seats, horn, windscreen wiper, the 
majority of the wiring harnesses, glass, paint, upholstery and small, simple pressed metal 
parts. In other words these are mid-tech products, at best, and thus do not constitute high 
value-added goods. 
The still sharply rising yen makes ever more expensive the Japanese parts and 
components. Thus Magyar Suzuki is trying to increase the Hungarian content of its cars. To 
achieve this end, it considers to produce certain parts by itself (mainly pressed metal parts) 
and/or assist its supplier to add further parts to their product lines. Some 2–3 billion forints 
will be spent in 1995 to finance this project and the introduction of a 3-door Swift model. 
Yet, Magyar Suzuki intends to keep importing high-tech, high value added components, such 
as engine, transmission and undercarriage, from Japan. As these sub-systems account for 
around 20 per cent of value-added, the local content might eventually reach 80 per cent. Most 
likely it would take 6–8 years, at least.26 
 
                                                
24 As already mentioned, the nominal capacity of Magyar Suzuki is 50,000 cars a year, not reached as yet. 
Hence this is the largest series for most suppliers as Suzuki parts in most cases are not compatible with other 
models and exportation to Japanese Suzuki plants is an exception so far. Aftermarket, though, might provide 
some additional sales opportunities. 
25 One must not overlook, however, that a topsi-turvy system of prices, taxes, tariffs and subsidies in the former 
economic system, let alone the very fact that domestic, Western and CMEA markets had been insulated, had 
made it impossible to apply any reasonable cost accounting. Thus it had been a rational behaviour in a rather 
irrational system not to waste time and intellectual resources with hopeless efforts aimed at introducing 
advanced accounting methods. 
26 It depends on sales opportunities and macroeconomic developments, e.g. interest rates, too, as further 
investments are required either at Magyar Suzuki’s Esztergom plant or at suppliers. 
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Table 4: Distribution of value-added at Magyar Suzuki (per cent) 
 October 1992 January 1995 
(1) Magyar Suzuki  21 23 
(2) Hungarian suppliers  8 27 
(3) Local content (1+2) 29 50 
(4) EU suppliers* 3 14 
(5) EU content (3+4) 32 64 
(6) Japanese suppliers 68 36 
(7) Total (5+6) 100 100 
Source: Magyar Suzuki 
* Including associated member countries 
Originally it seemed unlikely that Hungarian suppliers could export their products to the 
Japanese plants of Suzuki Motor Corp., given significant lag in productivity and substantial 
transportation costs, let alone the then shrinking demand for new cars in Japan. Thus, as 
already mentioned, they had no other choice than produce economically in relatively low 
production runs, and make considerable efforts to find additional businesses. However, 
exports to Japan started in late 1994. Clearly, it is encouraging but one should not forget that 
this is not a major business yet. 
1994 saw another promising development, though not in Hungary – indeed, rather far 
away, namely in India, where Suzuki has a 50/50 owned joint venture, Maruti Udyog, with 
the Indian government. Commercial production at Maruti began in 1983, and now it is 
India’s largest car manufacturer with its currently expanded capacity (from 130,000 to 
200,000 vehicles a year) It controls 70 per cent of the Indian car market. Suzuki started to 
export its Alto minicar, produced by Maruti Udyog, to west Europe last year. The Alto is the 
first model Suzuki has developed at an overseas production base for introduction in overseas 
markets. If it follows this pattern in Hungary, too, Hungarian suppliers, and in particular their 
R&D and production engineers, might be involved in really demanding and challenging 
product development projects. In other words, it would be a clear test, whether Suzuki 
applies lean production, i.e. it gives increased responsibility to its suppliers in product 
development. 
4.3.3 Opel Hungary 
Opel Hungary Vehicle Manufacturing Ltd (GM Hungary until 1994) operates the other 
Hungarian car assembly plant in a customs-free zone at Szentgotthárd (close to the Austrian 
border).27 Unlike Magyar Suzuki it is financed in hard currency, namely DM. Its equity has 
been increased several times: in 1994 it amounted to DM154.4m, subscribed by GM Opel 
(65.1%), RÁBA, a Hungarian engineering company (20.6%) and the State Development 
Institute (14.3%). In January 1995, however, GM Opel acquired the other shareholders’ 
stakes, and thus now it has 100 per cent ownership of Opel Hungary. Initially GM Opel has 
invested over DM400m with the bulk financed by loans, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, e.g., has provided a DM125m loan. Like Magyar Suzuki, 
Opel Hungary has also received a Ft250m government subsidy, and a five-year exemption 
from company tax has also been granted, too. 
The car assembly plant has accounted for some 25% of the original investment, while the 
engine factory for the remaining 75%. Some 12,300 Astra rolled off the line in the 
                                                
27 This section is based on interviews with Opel Hungary managers, Havas [1994a] and press reports. 
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Szentgotthárd plant in 1994,28 of which 1,100 were exported. As Opel’s European-wide 
production and distribution plans for 1995 call for significantly lower exports (i.e. some 550 
units) from Hungary, only 11,100 will be produced in 1995. Astras are made of almost 
exclusively imported parts in Szentgotthárd. Parts purchased in Hungary, now including 
battery, loudspeakers, paint, pressed metal parts and sun roof, initially accounted for merely 
4% of an Astra’s value, and 14% by 1994. (Table 6) Opel Hungary intends to increase local 
content, but definitely not to the order of 60–80%. In this respect it prefers local companies 
in joint ventures with its traditional Western suppliers. 
Opel Hungary (would-be) suppliers, however, have the opportunity to ship their products 
not only to Szentgotthárd but to other GM plants all over Europe, too, what would mean a 
much larger volume, i.e. several hundred thousand units a year. Thus they could rely on 
economies of scale. Indeed, Hungarian parts purchased by other GM companies amounted to 
some DM100m in 1994, i.e. worth ten times more than Hungarian parts built into Astras 
produced in Szentgotthárd. Moreover, a substantial increase is expected in 1995 when 
exports are going to reach DM150m. 
As for the engine factory, the initially planned output was above 200,000 units a year. 
Some 22,000 engines were produced in 1992 and 75,000 in 1993 (recession in Western 
Europe prevented to reach the planned output, that is, 130,000 units), primarily 1.4l ones, in 
one shift. Another line of products was added in 1994, namely a range of 1.6l engines. Then 
production reached 160,000 units (instead of the projected 200,000). 
Table 5: Production of Opel Hungary, 1992–1995 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 
    plan 
Cars (units) 9,300 13,344 12,282 11,100 
Engines (units) 22,000 75,000 160,000 260,000 
Source: Press reports 
In March 1995 GM announced to invest a further DM257m in Opel Hungary to double its 
engine plant’s capacity (DM47m) and add cylinder heads to its product lines (DM210m). The 
investment should be completed by late 1996. Then Opel Hungary would produce 460,000 
engines and cylinder heads. It would also require 220 additional jobs, and thus total 
employment is to be raised to 850. 
The engine factory would, therefore, also provide a good business opportunity for 
Hungarian suppliers, at least as far as production run is concerned, but most parts are 
imported, just as with the car assembly plant. Constant efforts have been made to source 
various components from Hungarian firms, but even the technologically most capable ones 
are unwilling to endeavour such a complex and demanding task as engine component 
manufacturing is. 
 
                                                
28 Car production commenced in April 1992. Nominal capacity is 15,000 units a year. 
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Table 6: Local content of Opel Hungary’s main products, 1992–1994 
 Opel Astra engine 
 per cent per cent 
1992 4 1 
1993 11 2.5 
1994 14 2.5 
Source: Author’s interviews 
To conclude, GM Opel and Suzuki Motor have chosen Hungary to build new assembly 
plants because skilled labour has been relatively cheap, and the government has offered both 
subsidies and concessions to ease the annoying shortage of cars, and, in the meantime, 
facilitate industrial re-structuring via promoting the diffusion of up-to-date technologies. As 
the Hungarian car assembly has been re-established via greenfield investment projects, there 
has been no ‘old’ industry either to be replaced or displaced, as opposed to other former 
CMEA countries. Hence there is no room for conflicts between traditions and new practices, 
either. One might recall that all the Japanese transplants have been located in the ‘desert’, i.e. 
regions with no automotive tradition, both in the US and the UK for the very reason to avoid 
these sorts of conflicts. 
Since these investment decisions have been made, however, marked changes have 
occurred both in the Hungarian and international economic settings. Shortage has virtually 
disappeared given liberalised imports, on the one hand, and although demand has recovered 
since 1992, it is still below the 1988–89 level because of the deteriorating standard of living, 
on the other hand. Other Central and Eastern European markets have become far less ‘fat’, 
too, in part for similar reasons, and in part because of the aforementioned strategic moves of 
major car companies in the region. Relatively cheap Eastern European cars, most notably 
Ladas, still pose a significant challenge both for Suzuki and Opel in the local market. As for 
exports, competition from these cheap cars only effects Magyar Suzuki as it intends to export 
half of its output, while Opel Hungary sells the vast majority, i.e. some 95%, of its cars in 
Hungary. Magyar Suzuki exports plan might also be hampered by the still depressed – 
moreover, mature and saturated – Western European market. Thus these foreign investors are 
likely to be less satisfied than they expected in the mid- or late 1980s when they had made 
their decisions to invest in Hungary. 
Yet, in 1995 both companies responded with further investment projects. Magyar Suzuki 
intends to increase the local content in order to offset the rising yen’s impact on production 
costs. Opel Hungary, on the other hand, puts even more emphasis on its engine 
manufacturing activities via doubling its capacity and adding further components to the 
current product lines. 
Finally, the Hungarian government’s policy measures should be assessed in an 
international context. However, no systematic comparative data are available on investment 
incentives provided by governments and regional authorities for car manufacturers. Hence 
only individual cases can be mentioned here. AutoEuropa, a joint venture of Ford and 
Volkswagen to produce minivans in Portugal, has invested PTE450bn (around DM5.4bn) of 
which PTE130bn has been subsidies, basically financed by EU grants to promote backward 
regions.29 In other words, almost one third of the project has been financed by subsidies 
obtained in the frame of various schemes. 
                                                
29 For further details, see Bongardt [1994]. 
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Press reports believed in the late 1980s that Nissan also negotiated with the British 
government to receive about a third of its total investment costs for its green-field plant to be 
built at Sunderland, a declining region in the northern part of England. Eventually it was 
‘only’ a fourth of its costs for phases I and II, i.e. £100m regional aid for its £390m project. 
A few years later it spent a further £217m to expand capacity, of which £25m, i.e. more than 
10 per cent, was financed by government subsidies.30 
In Hungary, by contrast, usually less than 1 per cent of total investment costs were 
covered by government grants. 
4.4 New car sales in Hungary 
As already mentioned, new car sales used to be dominated by CMEA-made cars, i.e. Ladas, 
Trabants, Wartburgs, Skodas, Dacias and Polski Fiats. The two new car assembly plants and 
the radically increased prices of the former ‘champions’ have completely changed this 
picture. However, imported cars are still popular, in other words, competitive with locally 
assembled ones, in particular Ladas, but Western makes as well, such VW with its 7–8 per 
cent market share in 1993–94. (The whole VW group has captured an even larger portion of 
the market, almost identical to Suzuki’s slice from the pie.) Thus the local market is more 
evenly served by a number of makes than in other Central and Eastern European countries 
with long-established, monopolised car industry. 
 
Table 7: New car sales and market share of major makes in Hungary, 1992–1994 
Makes 1992 1993 1994 
 number per cent number per cent number per cent 
Opel 8,238 19.53 17,100 20.42 21,527 20.67 
Lada 9,582 22.71 16,654 19.88 17,494 16.79 
Suzuki 929 2.20 12,537 14.97 16,775 16.10 
Volkswagen 
group 
7,227 17.13 10,783 12.87 15,169 14.56 
  of which       
    Volkswagen 5,755 13.64 6,177 7.37 8,608 8.26 
    Skoda 401 0.95 2,723 3.25 3,721 3.57 
    Seat 1,071 2.54 1,883 2.25 2,840 2.73 
Ford 2,903 6.88 5,314 6.34 5,733 5.50 
Renault 2,282 5.41 3,634 4.34 5,356 5.14 
Others 11,023 26.14 17,736 21.18 22,112 21.24 
Total 42,184 100 83,758 100 104,166 100 
Sources: Magyar Suzuki, Figyelő, May 12, 1994, HVG, February 11, 1995 
5 RE-STRUCTURING IN THE HUNGARIAN CAR PARTS SECTOR 
Ownership, organisational and market changes are going on literally month by month at a 
firm level, and hence the overall picture is constantly changing. In other words, one trying to 
capture adjustment and re-structuring efforts and results has inevitably to shoot at a ‘moving 
target’. Therefore a really up-to-date statistical system would be required to follow these 
shifts. As already mentioned, however, no statistics are available on this sector, and hence re-
structuring cannot be analysed in a methodologically satisfactory manner at a sectoral level. 
                                                
30 For further details, see Hudson [1992] 
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However, some qualitative observations, based on interview evidence, seem to be relevant 
for the sector as a whole, and thus worth putting forward here. 
5.1 Privatisation 
Most companies have already privatised in one way or another (see below). As already 
mentioned, however, exact ownership figures are not available. Yet, a list of actual 
ownership forms – and hence that of privatisation methods – can be drawn.31 
 
A) DOMINANT FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 
A.1 Greenfield investments with 100 per cent foreign ownership. For the purpose of 
further analysis, it is useful to identify two sub-sets in this group: 
A.1.1 Subsidiaries of car manufacturers: Ford Hungária, the engine plant of Opel Hungary 
and AUDI Hungária Motor Kft. 
A.1.2 Subsidiaries of component manufacturers, e.g. ITT Automotive Hungary, United 
Technologies Automotive Hungary, Jung Hungária, Michels Kabel, Keiper-Recaro. 
A.2 ‘Brownfield’ investments: former state-owned companies privatised by foreign 
investors via setting up a joint venture; e.g. Fékszerelvénygyár. 
 
B) DOMINANT HUNGARIAN OWNERSHIP 
B.1 State-owned companies, e.g. ELZETT Certa, MGM 
B.2 Privatised former state-owned companies: in most cases privatisation has only been 
partial so far, usually as a combination of ESOP and MBO projects; e.g. Bakony 
Mûvek Rt., MMG Automatika Rt., Perion Akkumulátorgyár Rt. 
B.3 Private companies, i.e. firms established by Hungarian entrepreneurs either in the 
1960s or more recently, e.g. ABF 
B.4 Joint ventures with dominant Hungarian private ownership, e.g. RATIPUR Car 
Equipment Co. 
5.2 Market changes 
5.2.1 Market structure, competition 
The domestic car parts market, in particular the so-called aftermarket, used to be 
characterised by severe shortage and monopolies or quasi-monopolies, as already mentioned. 
Transition has caused significant changes in this respect, too. As former entry barriers have 
been lifted, new private companies can now enter, and indeed, have already entered. Some 
companies are still the only domestic producer of given parts. Yet, due to import 
liberalisation, most firms have foreign competitors in the domestic market, i.e. hardly any 
firms enjoy monopoly. What is perhaps even more important, a majority of companies are 
exporting their products to the industrialised countries where they face fierce competition 
either from local firms or from other exporters (or both). Product quality, product reliability 
and lower price are mentioned most frequently by managers as the most important sources of 
competitiveness. Thus there are fairly strong incentives to introduce new products and/or 
                                                
31 Havas [1995b] provides a series of short case studies to illustrate some major characteristics of these groups 
of companies. For Ford and Audi see also Havas [1994b] and [1995a]. 
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processes otherwise it would not be possible to improve quality and reliability and increase 
efficiency to be able to quote lower prices than competitors. 
5.2.2 Market re-orientation 
Interviews, indirect evidence – e.g. shrinking Lada sales, as already discussed in Section 4 – 
and press reports suggest that most companies have lost at least a large chunk of their former 
markets, i.e. the ex-Soviet and other CMEA markets.32 Thus they have been forced either to 
find new buyers – the new car assembly plants in Hungary and/or Western car parts 
companies operating in Hungary as producers or buyers – or to significantly cut their staff 
because of shrinking revenues. In most cases the new market opportunities have not 
compensated for the lost former ones, and thus even those companies who became Magyar 
Suzuki and/or Opel Hungary suppliers, or found export markets, also had to dismiss some of 
their personnel. Some companies have not survived this ‘test’: they have been – or are being 
– dissolved.33 
5.3 Technological changes 
Havas [1994a] analysed a sample of 16 Hungarian car parts suppliers from the point of view 
of technological changes. These were either Magyar Suzuki or Opel Hungary suppliers 
already in 1992 or 1993, i.e. the new entrants, especially foreign-owned greenfield 
investments were not covered as most of them started commercial production after 1992, on 
the one hand, were not Magyar Suzuki or Opel Hungary suppliers. In the other words, Audi, 
Ford and other foreign investment projects, representing high-tech, high value added 
products, were not included. 
In other words, most companies in that sample did not have access either to foreign capital 
or to R&D skills and results of large multinational firms. Yet, almost all of them introduced 
both product and process innovations. As for the sources of product innovations, car 
producers (or their suppliers) and in-house development have played a significant role in 
introducing new products. Other sources have included parent companies, commissioned 
research, other firms (partner in innovation with no other links), and licences. All these 
innovations came from the sector itself or related industries. 
Every single firm in the sample has also introduced at least one major or minor process 
change. As car manufacturers require total quality management and just-in-time delivery, the 
introduction of these techniques has been the most frequent process change. (see below) 
Modernisation of machinery has been the other dominant form of process innovations. Car 
producers (or their suppliers) have again played a significant role alike in the case of product 
innovations. A marked, and in fact a self-explanatory, difference is, though, that material and 
machine suppliers have also been instrumental. In other words, the diffusion of embodied 
technologies has considerably contributed to technological improvements. Other sources of 
process innovations have included in-house development, consulting services, parent 
companies and R&D institutes, including university departments. 
                                                
32 One large company, e.g., used to ship as much as 700,000 units a year to the former Soviet Union. Nowadays 
its exports are under 50,000 units a year. It has completely lost its former Polish and Yugoslav markets for 
reasons already analysed in Section 4. 
33 As for the MGM case see, e.g. HVG, April 8, 1995 and on ELZETT Certa Népszabadság, April 22, 1995. 
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5.4 Managerial innovations 
As already mentioned, Hungarian car parts companies have to adjust a radically altered 
international and domestic environment (import liberalisation, loss of former markets, new 
players in Hungary, etc.). Thus those who want to survive have also introduced new 
management techniques. The most important types of these innovations are total quality 
management and reliable cost accounting. Their foreign partners usually provide technical 
assistance and training courses to facilitate the introduction of these techniques. 
Just-in-time (JIT) is one of the ‘buzz words’ in automotive industry, and increasingly in 
other industries, too. However, fashionable terms are frequently used in a somewhat 
misleading way as most people are not careful enough to apply them appropriately. This is 
the case with JIT, too. One should make a clear distinction between JIT-production (when 
parts are produced when the need for them arises, i.e. total inventory in the whole production 
system is really at a minimal level), and JIT-type delivery (when there is hardly any change 
in terms of the production, and hence the total inventory is not reduced, but all the ‘physical’ 
and financial burdens of keeping inventory and of logistics are imposed on suppliers).34 
Clearly, the low capacity of local car assembly does not allow JIT-production in Hungary. 
Yet, would-be suppliers of Audi, Ford and the Opel Hungary engine plants, as well as those 
of other customers buying parts in large quantities, i.e. at least a few hundred thousand units 
a year, might be able to apply JIT-production, and thus eliminate waste, reduce the total 
inventory of the entire system and cut costs. 
There are some exceptional cases, too: e.g. a small company assembling wheels for Opel 
Hungary has been able to reduce inventory thanks to the close co-operation with its 
customer. It ships complete sub-systems in every two hours. 
Managerial innovations can be analysed at a sectoral level, too, as opposed to individual 
company level. In lean production first-tier suppliers assume a considerable part of 
responsibility for product development as well as for organisation of the supply chain 
(logistics) as they build and supply sub-systems, rather than individual components. In other 
words they are responsible for second-tier – and indirectly – for third-tier suppliers’ 
performance, too. Thus they also provide training, technical assistance to their suppliers to 
facilitate the introduction of an appropriate quality management, cost accounting, production 
and delivery systems, etc. Western carmakers follow this way, i.e. they cut the number of 
their first-tier (direct) suppliers and give them more responsibility. 
Interviews suggest that this ‘tiering’ has hardly occurred in Hungary yet. One should not 
be surprised, however, as most Hungarian companies supply fairly simple, individual parts, 
rather than complex sub-systems to their customers. Moreover, they are not involved in 
product development, either, as it was discussed in the previous subsection. Yet, some 
preliminary signs of the emerging new supply system can be observed in certain cases. 
Suppliers facing the exacting demand of their customers try to apply some principles of total 
quality management at least. 
There are failures, or to put it less harshly, lack of understanding, too. Opel Hungary, e.g., 
has agreed with a Hungarian company that it would supply a certain part for Astras. In other 
words, this company has been able to meet the Opel requirements in terms of quality and 
price. Nonetheless, one month before it was due to start shipments, it informed Opel Hungary 
that one of its subcontractor – that is, a second-tier supplier in this supply chain – had gone 
bankrupt, and thus there was no possibility to fulfil the contract. Opel managers were 
                                                
34 For a more detailed discussion see Havas [1994c]. 
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astonished: their would-be partner neither had sufficient information about its supplier, nor 
an alternative source of supply for such a case. 
One should take into account that it is a fairly new concept even for the Western European 
managers, who are accustomed to, at least, the ‘normal’ mechanisms and requirements of a 
market economy. Even so, they are far from reaching the full potential of lean production. As 
a recent analysis of the British automotive industry claims, British managers have a long way 
to go, too, on the road leading towards ‘tiering’: 
“By collaboration, the first tier of suppliers may help to develop the value chain of vehicle 
manufacturer or the progress and competitiveness of a national or regional industry. There 
has been little such activity so far: indeed the major UK suppliers could more accurately 
be called an unconnected group, rather than a first tier.” (DTI and SMMT [1994], p. 11) 
Their Hungarian counter-parts, however, have to learn even the ‘simple’ techniques of 
market economy, too, not only these new principles of lean supply. Moreover, in the mean 
time they also have to struggle for survival. 
6 PROSPECTS FOR HUNGARIAN CAR PARTS SUPPLIERS 
This section analyses the major characteristics of different types of companies in the 
framework of a tentative taxonomy. It also considers the most likely prospects for these 
groups of companies. 
A) DOMINANT FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 
A.1 Greenfield investments with 100 per cent foreign ownership 
A.1.1 Subsidiaries of car manufacturers 
 Products: mid- or high-tech (e.g. Audi’s five-valve engine: first commercial 
production), high value-added 
 Processes: state-of-the-art, capital and skill-intensive, but not labour-intensive 
 Size: a few hundred employees at present, significant growth is expected as further 
stages of investment projects are completed and capacity is built up, yet employment 
is not going to exceed 1000 in the 1990s in either of these cases 
 Portfolio of activities: specialised in automotive components 
 Markets: a single customer, but geographically spread markets, including e.g. South-
America in the case of Ford Hungária, i.e. assembly plants of their parent company. 
Thus basically 100 per cent of output is exported (except a few thousands Opel 
engines, what is a very small fraction, some 5–6 per cent, of total production). 
 Outlook: rather stable markets as these investments require substantial capital, i.e. 
these projects present a fairly strong commitment from the respective parent 
companies, yet depend on overall automotive trends (global and regional demand, 
competitiveness of parent companies, environmental regulation, technological trends, 
etc.) and strategic moves of parent companies (sourcing, location, re-location, 
investment, R&D, etc.) 
 Impacts on 
• employment and skills: although some more companies are likely to invest in 
Hungary, it is unlikely that these companies would create tens of thousands of 
jobs. Yet, through their suppliers, i.e. taking into account indirect job creation, 
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too, their role in employment seems to be more significant. Moreover, they 
demand highly skilled labour, both directly and indirectly. 
• R&D: the most important R&D projects are likely be conducted by their parent 
companies in their home countries, some minor product development 
(modification) can be envisaged, especially if they are to supply car assemblers in 
the region other than their parent companies. 
• demand: most of them have already started searching for Hungarian suppliers, 
thus in the medium run they are likely to create demand for mid- or high-tech 
parts for their products. Given their capacity, it is going to be substantial for 
individual companies, and significant at the level of various industrial branches, 
too. 
• suppliers’ performance: strong spill-over effects can be expected (product and 
process technologies, management techniques [TQM, JIT, cost-accounting, cost 
reduction, value engineering]). Hence they are likely to ‘train’ their suppliers to 
enter new markets. 
• environment: usually they are more concerned with environmental issues than 
Hungarian companies used to be. A considerable amount is spent to minimise 
pollution, e.g. sophisticated systems are introduced to re-cycle waste material. 
Yet, there is a threat that some investors might want to re-locate production 
activities which are no longer tolerated in their home countries. 
 
A.1.2 Subsidiaries of component manufacturers 
and 
A.2 ‘Brownfield’ investments 
 Products: typically mid-tech, some high-tech, mid- or high value-added 
 Processes: state-of-the-art or fairly up-to-date, skill-intensive, less capital and more 
labour-intensive than in the case of car manufacturers’ subsidiaries 
 Size: a few hundred employees at present, further growth is expected as further stages 
of investment projects are completed and capacity is built up, employment might 
exceed 1000 in the 1990s in some cases 
 Portfolio of activities: specialised in automotive components 
 Markets: a number of customers, usually at least 3–5 leading Western European car 
manufacturers (Volkswagen, Ford Europe, GM Europe, BMW, Mercedes, etc.) and in 
some cases Magyar Suzuki, too. Hence the vast majority of output is exported in 
these cases, as well. 
 Outlook: still fairly stable business opportunities due to the long-established contacts 
between parent companies and customers. Yet the future of these operations are less 
certain than for car manufacturers’ subsidiaries for two basic reasons. First, their 
parents have to do business with a number of clients – who, in turn, operate in a 
highly competitive and volatile, in a way still evolving industry due to (a) new 
entrants, especially South-Korean ones, and (b) emerging markets, e.g. Pacific Rim, 
South-America and to a lesser extent Central and Eastern Europe –, and thus risks are 
multiplied, future demand is more difficult to forecast. For the very same reason, 
however, risks can be spread more widely, i.e. among more customers, as their 
market opportunities vary. Second, these projects – so far, at least – represent a 
different magnitude of investment, i.e. tens – rather than hundreds – of millions of 
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DM, and hence if future business opportunities become really gloomy, it would be 
relatively easy to leave, i.e. sunk costs are less significant. 
 Impacts on 
• employment and skills: some more car parts manufacturing companies are likely 
to invest in Hungary, yet, their impact seems to be less significant on employment 
than that of A.1.1. companies. 
• R&D: all R&D projects are likely be conducted by their parent companies in their 
home countries. 
• demand: they are likely to create demand for low- or mid-tech parts. Given their 
size, it might be substantial for individual companies, but less significant at the 
level of various industrial branches, than in the case of A.1.1. companies. 
• suppliers’ performance: some spill-over effects can be expected (product and 
process technologies, management techniques [TQM, JIT, cost-accounting, cost 
reduction, value engineering]). Hence they are likely to contribute the ‘training’ 
of their suppliers to make them able to enter new markets, but additional 
‘training’ might be required. 
• environment: similar threats as in the case of A.1.1. companies 
 
B) DOMINANT HUNGARIAN OWNERSHIP 
B.1 State-owned companies 
 Products: typically low-tech with some mid-tech, low value-added 
 Processes: usually simple material processing, ageing, general-purpose, machinery, 
installed in the late 1970s, early 1980s, at best, typically labour-intensive with some 
exception (i.e. there some capital-intensive companies, too given technical 
requirements, e.g. ball-bearings) 
 Size: up to 1,500–2,000 employees at present, shrinking can be expected 
 Portfolio of activities: diversified, a wide range of products, car parts are often of 
secondary importance 
 Markets: a number of customers, in the case of car parts usually 1–2 leading Western 
car parts manufacturers (ITT, Rockwell, etc., i.e. no direct link with Western car 
manufacturers) and in most cases Magyar Suzuki, too. A considerable part of their car 
parts output is exported in these cases, as well. 
 Outlook: rather uncertain, their customers might find cheaper suppliers. 
 Impacts on 
• employment and skills: in certain regions these companies are the principal 
employers. Hence their gloomy outlook, suggesting closure or significant 
shrinking, is likely to cause severe problems in their regions. Their closure would 
mean the end of industrial training, too, as they are also the principal providers of 
practical training for apprentices. 
• R&D: hardly any in-house R&D projects or demand for extra-mural ones can be 
expected from them. 
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• demand: some of them are major customers for regional SMEs. Their demand, 
therefore, is likely to be substantial for these SMEs, but not significant at the level 
of various industrial branches. 
• suppliers’ performance: hardly any spill-over effects can be expected. 
• environment: sometimes considerable threats, significant investment might be 
required to ‘clean’ their production processes and undo the harmful effects of 
pollution emitted in the former decades. 
B.2 Privatised former state-owned companies (MBO-ESOP) 
 Products: typically mid-tech or low-tech, mid-value-added 
 Processes: similar to B.1. type companies, usually somewhat less obsolete 
 Size: medium or large 
 Portfolio of activities: medium-sized ones are usually specialised in automotive 
components, large ones are diversified, then car parts are often of secondary 
importance 
 Markets: similar to B.1. type companies. 
 Outlook: slightly more promising than for B.1. type companies (that is why their 
managers and employees acquired ownership stakes in these companies, as opposed 
to B.1. types). However, as privatisation has been financed through loans – although 
favourable ones – debt service might threaten their future since hardly any profits can 
be retained for badly needed investments (in machinery, product development and 
marketing). 
 Impacts on 
• employment and skills: similar to B.1. type companies. 
• R&D: some in-house R&D projects or demand for extra-mural ones can be 
expected from them. 
• demand: similar to B.1. type companies. 
• suppliers’ performance: some spill-over effects can be expected. 
• environment: similar to B.1. type companies. 
As for private companies and joint ventures with dominant Hungarian private ownership, 
it would not be sensible to continue the above analysis as they differ considerably from each 
other, i.e. their products, processes, market opportunities can vary on a very wide scale. Two 
distinctive features, however, can be pointed out. First, usually they are much smaller than 
the above companies. Second, the so-called aftermarket is usually much more significant for 
them than for the larger ones. 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Car parts industry has a long-established tradition in Hungary. Although its former single 
most important market, that is, the ex-CMEA has collapsed, new market opportunities have 
emerged in the domestic market as Suzuki and GM Opel have opened car assembly plants, 
and the latter one an engine plant as well. Audi has also invested in an engine plant in 
Hungary. New export markets can also be found as Western European car manufacturers, 
working under tremendous competitive pressure due to the still depressed demand in their 
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home markets and the aggressive growth strategy of the far more efficient lean producers, are 
also seeking low-cost parts suppliers. 
Hungarian suppliers try to adjust to this rapidly changing environment via introduction of 
new products and processes. In most cases they rely upon licences, know-how, up-to-date 
management techniques and training provided by their clients and/or their first tier supplier 
as well as by parent companies in the case of firms privatised by foreign investors. Their in-
house R&D capabilities are also used whenever these new technologies need to be modified 
to their existing production facilities. 
Some government policy tools, namely favourable technology loans and tax holidays, 
have had beneficial impact on technological improvements. Although a loan scheme, devised 
exclusively for auto parts suppliers, has been launched, more attention should be paid to the 
re-structuring of this sector. Other measures, such as grants, government sponsored 
technological training courses, export incentives, etc. should be applied. Japanese experience 
also shows that licences of advanced technologies, bought by the government and made 
available for domestic firms free of charge, can have a significant impact on the economic 
and technical performance of a(n) (re-)emerging sector. 
All the aforementioned new market opportunities pose a challenge for policy-makers, 
namely whether to promote Fordist or lean suppliers. In the former case Hungarian 
companies, provided that they can quote substantially lower prices due to their significantly 
lower wage costs than their competitors, might gain market share. However, it seems to be a 
temporary advantage. Moreover, as Table 8 indicates, the choice between Fordism and lean 
production has far-reaching impacts on industrial development through skills, wages, R&D 
capabilities, the diffusion of innovations and market opportunities. 
 
Table 8: Corollaries of Fordism and lean production 
 Fordism Lean production 
Skills De-skilling Skill development 
Wages Sustained low wages Increasing wages 
R&D Deterioration of R&D capacities 
Reinforced R&D efforts 
Re-structuring of R&D 
Diffusion Certain technologies in a closed circle 
Product, process & organisational 
innovations in a wider circle 
Market 
opportunities Limited 
Wider in the long run 
(through learning) 
Hence it is likely to be a far more beneficial industrial and technology policy to foster lean 
suppliers, i.e. to promote the acquisition of all the R&D, production and managerial skills 
and capabilities required by lean production. In other words, if the Hungarian government 
does not want to be locked into a low-wage, low-tech, low-value-added ‘development’ path, 
it needs to provide adequate funds for education and training, promote R&D capabilities and 
offer investment incentives geared towards lean production. No doubt, it is a rather 
demanding policy, both in terms of funds and capabilities. It also requires a sound knowledge 
of these industries, strategies of potential investors and a detailed analysis of various policy 
measures. Yet, it is worth taking this route as the other, more ‘comfortable’, one can only 
lead to sustained underdevelopment. 
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Foreign investments raise another crucial policy question as to whether apply harsh local 
content rules or set reasonable export targets together with the provision of a wide range of 
measures and incentives to facilitate exports. International experience suggests that the 
former regime might result in striking achievements for a certain period but the most likely 
outcome is that structural adjustment and technological improvements are hindered on a 
longer run. Thoroughly devised export incentives, on the other hand, seem to promote 
sustainable economic and technological success. 
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